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TAXES, CONSCIENCE, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
Steven D. Smith* 
I. TAX EXPENDITURES AND THE CLAIMS OF 
CONSCIENCE 
Al Agnostic and Betty Basic are neighbors-and citizens. 
They are also taxpayers. As humans, they do not especially relish 
paying taxes, but as citizens they understand that taxes are a civic 
necessity and obligation. Like most citizens, Al and Betty approve 
of some of the uses to which their tax dollars are devoted, and they 
disapprove of other uses. Sometimes they disapprove on grounds of 
policy: they simply do not think that particular expenditures are a 
good use of public funds. Sometimes their disapproval runs deeper: 
they might express this deeper opposition by saying that they are 
opposed "in conscience" to particular expenditures of public 
money. 
Naturally, the specific expenditures that provoke such scru-
ples differ as between Al and Betty. As an agnostic, Al opposes 
public expenditures that he sees as supporting or advancing re-
ligion. So he objects to the inclusion of religious institutions in 
publicly-supported programs established to provide social ser-
vices like job training or drug rehabilitation (the so-called "faith-
based initiatives"), and he also opposes the subsidization of reli-
gious schools (as in so-called voucher programs). By contrast, 
Betty is supportive of these types of expenditures. But as an 
evangelical Christian she is conscientiously opposed to programs 
that she sees as supporting or condoning premarital sex. And she 
is especially pained to think that her tax dollars are being used in 
the public schools to support the teaching of evolution and other 
ideas that she believes to be false, corrosive of civic virtue, and 
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank Larry 
Alexander, Ed Eberle, Tony Ellis, and participants in a workshop at Chicago-Kent for 
helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
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subversive of what she regards as the saving faith that she hopes 
to instill in her children and neighbors. 1 
So, do either Al's or Betty's objections have any sort of con-
stitutional status? More specifically, can Al or Betty plausibly 
claim a constitutional right to freedom of conscience that is vio-
lated when he or she is forced to pay taxes that will be used in 
part for these objectionable purposes? 
It is not hard to imagine a possible (though perhaps not very 
viable) argument suggesting that both Al and Betty's objections 
ought to have constitutional status. Al and Betty might join in 
urging the proposition that in a community that respects "the 
sanctity of conscience," citizens should not be forced to subsidize 
governmental activities to which they are conscientiously op-
posed. The First Amendment, with its assorted clauses protect-
ing the free exercise of religion and the freedom of speech, is 
sometimes viewed as a haven for conscience.2 So Al and Betty 
might try to anchor their appeals to conscience in that amend-
ment. 
In the abstract, it should not be hard to appreciate the ap-
peal-and the logic-of this argument. Nor should it be hard to 
appreciate the overwhelming practical objections that the argu-
ment will provoke. After all, many citizens and taxpayers will 
say, sincerely, that they are opposed in conscience to any num-
ber of things that (with the support of their tax dollars) govern-
ment doc:s. Some citizens are conscientiously opposed to particu-
lar (or all) military activities, others to particular government 
funded programs in the arts or in science, others to an array of 
"liberal" or "conservative" social programs. We can appreciate 
the problem if we let our imaginations run just a little and sup-
pose that Al's and Betty's argument were actually accepted by 
the courts: millions of citizens who have been thus encouraged to 
develop bloated consciences might thereby excuse themselves 
from all manner of taxes. 
That nightmare may easily lead us to the opposite conclu-
sion: neither Al nor Betty should be deemed to have a valid ob-
jection. More generally, objections of conscience cannot be per-
I. Citizens with this perspective are recognized in both scholarly and judicial legal 
literature. See, e.g., Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": As-
similation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
581 (1993); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
2. See, e.g., J. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 
1297 (1993) (describing '"the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First 
Amendment"') (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)). 
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mitted to excuse citizens from their basic civic obligation to pay 
taxes, even if these citizens have sincere moral objections (as 
many surely will) to some of the things government does with 
their money.3 
So there is an intelligible argument for accepting both Al's 
and Betty's claims of conscience, and there is a realistically more 
acceptable argument for rejecting both arguments. We can also 
imagine an argument that might support Betty's claim of con-
science but not Al's. After all, our Constitution does not explic-
itly recognize any "freedom of conscience" -such language was 
proposed when the First Amendment was drafted, only to be re-
jected4- but the Constitution does have a provision recognizing 
the right to "free exercise of religion." We can stipulate that Al's 
and Betty's objections are equally sincere and equally conscien-
tious, but we have also supposed that Betty's objection is 
grounded in religious belief; Al's is not. So Betty's claims may 
seem more at home in the Constitution as it is written.5 
Can we imagine an argument for the opposite result-for 
recognizing Al's claim of conscience but not Betty's? At least on 
first reflection, this alternative seems untenable. As noted, Al 
cannot as plausibly invoke the protection of the right to "free 
exercise of religion." Nor can he as easily ground his objection in 
the rationales that historically were offered for protecting rights 
of free exercise or of conscience. Claims of conscience were typi-
cally asserted in reaction to attempts to coerce people in matters 
of religion, and according to the classic defenses developed by 
luminaries like Roger Williams and John Locke and James 
Madison,6 such coercion was wrong because forced worship or 
religiosity is unacceptable to God-it "stincks in God's Nos-
trills," in Williams's pungent phrase. 7 It is doubtful whether 
Betty can successfully assert this rationale in this context,8 but 
3. This rejection would seem to apply as well, perhaps a fortiori, to citizens who 
have conscientious objections not to the way their tax dollars arc spent, but to the pay-
ment of taxes itself. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
4. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1481-84 (1990). 
5. For an assessment of the question whether the free exercise clause protects 
nonreligious manifestations of conscience, see Steven D. Smith, What Does Religion 
Have to Do with Freedom of Conscience?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 911 (2005). 
6. For an overview, sec REX AHDAR & IAl' LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE 
LIBERAL STATE 22-36 (2005) 
7. See Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on Liberty of Conscience, 10 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 289, 297 (2005). For a more recent version of this rationale, see 
JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 49-57 (1996). 
8. Betty can claim that payment of taxes for this purpose violates God's will, but 
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surely Al cannot cogently invoke it: after all, Al does not even 
believe that God exists. 
So perhaps we should be surprised to learn that a common 
view today, advocated by jurists like Justice David Souter9 and 
by scholars like Noah Feldman,10 would recognize Al's claim of 
conscience while politely declining to notice Betty's. Moreover, 
people who take this view often try to support it by quoting lan-
guage from venerable sources such as James Madison and Tho-
mas J efferson. 11 It is a curious position but also a longstanding 
one-and one that is arguably at the core of the distinctively 
American commitment to the nonestablishment of religion. Let 
us investigate that position more closely. 
II. FROM CONSCIENCE (THROUGH TAXES) 
TO NONESTABLISHMENT? 
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 12 the Supreme Court upheld 
a Cleveland voucher program that included religious schools 
among the institutions eligible to receive public funding. Dis-
senting, Justice Souter argued that the program violated the con-
sciences of taxpayers, and he quoted in support of this claim 
James Madison's famous statement that conscience is offended 
by any law that would "force a citizen to contribute three 
pence ... of his property for the support of any ... establish-
ment."13 
The basic argument had been made countless times before, 
of course. And in a sense it seems almost truistic: if the Constitu-
tion forbids government to establish religion (a proposition that 
by now is very well settled14), and if the inclusion of religious 
schools in a more general program of educational support is an 
establishment of religion (a proposition that remains hotly con-
tested), then it would seem to follow that the Cleveland voucher 
program violated the Constitution-even if the amount of fund-
ing directed to religious schools was relatively small (as it argua-
she cannot cogently make the classical argument about the inefficacy of forced worship, 
since the government is not attempting to induce her to worship. 
9. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
10. See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 33-43,246-47 (2005). 
11. See id. at 33-43. 
12. 536 u.S. 639 (2002). 
13. !d. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
14. For at least the first century or so of the Republic, the prevailing view had been 
that the First Amendment prohibited the national government but not the states from 
establishing religion. The turning point came with Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U.S. 1 (1947). 
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bly was not). "No aid" separationists have been making this ar-
gument almost from time immemorial, 15 or so it seems, and in 
the last century their position often prevailed (though perhaps 
less often toward the end of the century than closer to the mid-
dle)16. 
This argument can be made, however, and often is made, 
without any invocation of freedom of conscience. The "no aid" 
separationist can simply point out that the First Amendment 
contains a clause forbidding establishments of religion and then 
argue that a voucher program including religious schools trans-
gresses this prohibition. There seems to be no need to bring in-
dividual conscience into the argument at all. Conversely, "free-
dom of conscience" would seem to resonate more naturally with 
the free exercise clause than with the nonestablishment prohibi-
tion. 
Why then did Justice Souter emphasize that the allocation 
of public money to religious education violated the consciences 
of taxpayers? Though we can only guess at Souter's particular 
motivations, we can also imagine reasons why "no aid" separa-
tionists might want to assert a link between freedom of con-
science, taxes, and nonestablishment. Let us briefly notice four 
such reasons. 
First, a commitment to nonestablishment might be made 
stronger, and more rhetorically powerful, if tied to a commit-
ment to freedom of conscience. The case for respecting con-
science is arguably more compelling than the case for constitu-
tionally mandated nonestablishment. Conscience is an intimate 
personal concern-one that looks and sounds like the subject of 
a "right," even a "natural right"- while nonestablishment is more 
institutional and structural and abstract. Long before arguments 
for religious disestablishment went mainstream, major theorists 
like Locke along with scores of by-now-forgotten golemicists 
were pressing arguments for freedom of conscience. 7 Even to-
day, international human rights law embraces freedom of con-
science but does not mandate nonestablishment. 18 And nations 
15. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 
(2002). 
16. For an overview of these developments, see JoHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 149-84 (2000). 
17. For a scholarly overview of the historical developments, see ANDREW 
MURPHY, CONSCIENCE AND COMMUNITY: REVISITING TOLERATION AND RELIGIOUS 
DISSENT IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (2001 ). 
18. See Michael J. Perry, Whm Do the Free Exercise and Nonestablishment Norms 
Forbid?: Reflections on the ConstitLltional Law of Religious Freedom, 1 UNIV. OF ST. 
370 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:365 
we regard as civilized and progressive and supportive of religious 
freedom- England, for example- maintain established 
churches. 
In short, standing alone, the constitutional commitment to 
nonestablishment may seem vulnerable. Perhaps that commit-
ment would be rendered more secure if it could be tied success-
fully into the more unassailable right to freedom of conscience. 
Second, and more technically, linking nonestablishment to 
conscience may solidify the anomalous doctrine whereby tax-
payers are treated as having legal standing to challenge viola-
tions of the nonestablishment provision. Typically, the fact that a 
person pays taxes is not enough to permit him to bring a lawsuit 
challenging a constitutional infraction,19 even one involving the 
expenditure of public funds; the successful plaintiff needs to be 
able to assert a more concrete and particularized injury.20 Even if 
the consequence of this requirement is that no one has standing 
to challenge a constitutional violation, the courts have some-
times insisted on a showing of such personalized harm.21 In the 
area of nonestablishment, however, the courts have departed 
from this ~osition, routinely allowing litigants to claim "taxpayer 
standing." 2 Erwin Chemerinsky reports that "the only situation 
in which taxpayer standing appears permissible is if the plaintiff 
challenges a ~overnrnent expenditure as violating the establish-
ment clause." 3 
But why? The Supreme Court's own explanation of the ex-
ception borders on gibberish.24 But if taxpayers can plausibly 
claim that the use of their money to advance religion violates 
their consciences, then arguably the requisite personalized harm 
would be present. After all, a violation of conscience seems 
about as personal a harm as one could hope for. 
THOMAS L.J. 549, 564 (2003) (observing that "the international law of human rights does 
not include anything like the American nonestablishment norm"). 
19. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
20. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALllJRISDICTION 52 (1989). 
21. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
22. For a recent instance with a scholarly opinion by Judge Richard Posner and a 
thoughtful dissent by Judge Kenneth Ripple, see Freedom from Religion Foundation v. 
Chao, 74 U.S.L.W. 1446 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding taxpayer standmg m suit challengmg 
Bush Administration program promoting "faith-based initiatives") 
23. CIIE~ERINSKY, supra note 20, at 82. 
24. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See especially the dissenting opinion by Jus-
tice Harlan. 
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Third, if state monetary support for religion violates the 
consciences of taxpayers, a long-standing embarrassment in the 
constitutional doctrine of "incorporation" might be allayed. As 
all law students know, the Bill of Rights did not originally apply 
to the states, nor did the Supreme Court ever hold that the Four-
teenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights per se against 
the states (Justice Black notwithstanding). Instead, the Court 
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause in-
cluded certain substantive rights that were "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty,"25 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition. "26 And the Court treated various provisions 
in the Bill of Rights as authoritative expressions of some of these 
rights. Though often critical of the path taken by the Court, 
scholars have argued for a similar overall outcome by contend-
ing that rights contained in the Bill of Rights should have been 
treated as among the "privile.pes and immunities" referred to in 
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 
Under these "rights" rationales, it is easy enough to say that 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the free exercise 
clause-or perhaps some more general right to freedom of con-
science emanating from the free exercise and free speech 
clauses.28 But it is conceptually awkward to say that a merely 
structural limitation on the national government was somehow 
incorporated against the states. Thus, scholars and jurists have 
sometimes argued that the establishment clause (at least in its 
original meaning) could not have been incorporated against the 
states: the claim simply defies logic. 29 But if the payment of taxes 
to be used for religious purposes violates the taxpayers' rights of 
conscience, so that nonestablishment is a corollary of freedom of 
conscience, then this objection is readily overcome. That is be-
cause, once again, a right of conscience has a strong claim to be-
ing "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 
Finally, for those who believe that "original meaning" 
should count heavily or decisively in constitutional interpreta-
tion, linking "no aid" nonestablishment to freedom of con-
science might be helpful in parrying a threatening interpretation 
of the original meaning of the religion clauses. In recent years, 
25. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937). 
26. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977). 
27. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 181-87 (1998). 
28. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
29. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 27, at 41. See also Note, Rethinking the Incorpora-
tion of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700 (1992). 
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some scholars Uoined recently by Justice Clarence Thomas30) 
have argued that the establishment clause was not originally in-
tended to constitutionalize any particular substantive principle 
or right of religious freedom, but was merely intended to con-
firm the jurisdictional arrangement whereby relipion was a mat-
ter for the states, not the national government.3 One argument 
in support of this jurisdictional interpretation grows out of the 
fact of widespread disagreement during the founding period 
about the proper relation between government and religion: 
some citizens and states (Jefferson, and Virginia, for example) 
had concluded that government should not support religion, but 
other citizens and states (such as the Congregationalists in Mas-
sachusetts and Connecticut) believed that government support 
for religion was proper and necessary. Given this disagreement, 
supporters of the jurisdictional interpretation ask, how could 
Americans have converged to approve any substantive principle 
of religious freedom or nonestablishment? Instead, the Framers 
steered around substantive differences by simply agreeing that 
jurisdiction over such matters would remain where it had always 
been-with the states.32 
Opponents of this jurisdictional interpretation typically ar-
gue that despite their conspicuous differences, Americans of the 
period agreed on certain general principles in matters of religion. 
Specifically, they shared a commitment to freedom of con-
science.33 But even if it is persuasive, the argument asserting a 
consensus on conscience would seem most pertinent to the free 
30. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,726 (2005) (Thomas, 1., concurring). 
31. I have argued at length for this interpretation elsewhere. Steven D. Smith, The 
Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843 
(2006); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995). 
32. Douglas Laycock, though a critic of this interpretation, explains that "[t]hcre 
was not yet a consensus for disestablishment, which suggests that the Founders might not 
have been able to agree on a substantive understanding of the Establishment Clause. But 
they did not have to agree on disestablishment; they had to agree only on what powers 
they were denying to the federal government." Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology 
Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But 
Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 241-42 (2004). See also Daniel 0. Conkle, 
Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1113, 1133-35 
(1988). 
33. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 27-33. For Feldman's more developed 
argument, see Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 
NYU L. REV. 346 (2002). See also Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment 
Clause: A Reassessment, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 761, 775 (2005) ("Moreover, Americans 
throughout the fourteen nascent states agreed that freedom of religious conscience was 
an essential right."). 
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exercise clause. What does that argument have to do with the es-
tablishment clause? 
While exploring various difficulties with the argument, 
Noah Feldman suggests that "no aid" nonestablishment can be 
derived from the shared commitment to freedom of conscience.34 
Why? Because forcing taxpayers to support religions contrary to 
their beliefs is a violation of their freedom of conscience. So if 
Americans of the period agreed in supporting freedom of con-
science, they effectively agreed on a principle of "no financial 
aid" to religion as well. 
III. CONNECfiONS HISTORICAL AND 
LOGICAL-OR NOT 
In sum, the contention linking conscience to nonestablish-
ment via taxes may be important to the separationist position 
(and, arguably, to the distinctive American commitment to non-
establishment itself) in a variety of ways. This contention can be 
advanced or understood in two quite different senses, or in terms 
of what we can call "the historical claim" and "the entailment 
claim." (In actual debate, of course, these claims usually are not 
clearly distinguished.) 
The historical claim asserts that founding era Americans be-
lieved that the use of tax money for religious purposes was a vio-
lation of conscience. They may have been right or they may have 
been wrong, but this was what they believed; and their belief was 
constitutionalized in the First Amendment. Or at least so runs 
the claim. The entailment claim, by contrast, asserts that what-
ever Americans may have believed, or whatever they may be-
lieve today, the use of tax money for religious purposes just is a 
violation of conscience. So if our Constitution protects freedom 
of conscience, a principle of "no aid" to religion logically follows. 
Interesting questions might arise if we were to conclude that 
the historical claim is correct but the entailment claim is not. 
What would follow, in other words, if we concluded that the 
founding generation believed that the use of tax money for reli-
gious purposes violated conscience but that their belief was (and 
is) mistaken? Should we conclude that the founding generation's 
belief, however misguided, was cemented into the Constitution, 
so that short of constitutional amendment we are bound by that 
belief despite its deficiencies? Or should we instead conclude 
34. Feldman, supra note 33, at 418-25. 
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that the case is comparable to that of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the principle of racial equality? In discussions of 
Brown v. Board of Education, for example, it has become a sort 
of commonplace that the Framers believed they could constitu-
tionalize equality without dismantling racial segregation in 
schools and other contexts, but we now realize that they were 
mistaken about the implications of their principle, and we are 
bound to respect what the principle really means, not what its 
enactors mistakenly thought it meant.35 Perhaps the ostensible 
link between freedom of conscience and "no aid" nonestablish-
ment is like that? 
We can avoid this conundrum, however, either by rejecting 
the historical claim or by accepting the entailment claim. And 
indeed, the historical claim seems hard to square with the his-
torical evidence, because in fact the founding generation does 
not seem to have shared the view that the use of tax money for 
religious purposes was a violation of anyone's freedom of con-
SClence. 
Some Americans thought this, of course-probably quite a 
few. Jefferson is a good example. The famous preamble to his 
Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom did not use the term "con-
science," but the idea is clearly there: the Bill's eloquent premise 
is that "Almighty God hath created the mind free," and the pre-
amble reasons on to the proposition that "to compel a man to 
furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions 
which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."36 We might call 
this the Jeffersonian proposition. It is nicely congruent with the 
position advocated by Souter, Feldman, and others of a similar 
inclination. 37 
It is clear, however, that other Americans of the founding 
generation rejected the Jeffersonian proposition. The fact that 
New Englanders continued for decades to maintain and defend 
state support for religion even as they also endorsed freedom of 
conscience is powerful evidence that they did not acknowledge 
the controversial entailment.38 For them (as for contemporary 
35. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TE\1PTI:-;G OF AMERICA 74--S3 (1990). 
36. The bill is reproduced in THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 25-27 
(RobertS. Alley ed., 1988). 
37. For example, in arguing for a strict "no aid" position in Everson v. Board of 
Education, Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion repeatedly quoted Jefferson's proposi-
tion. 330 U.S. 1, at 28, 44, 46,60 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
38. Feldman, supra note 33, at 416. Feldman sometimes suggests that even those 
who favored state financial support for religion acknowledged, at least in principle, that 
freedom of conscience required permitting objectors to opt out or to designate a recipi-
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human rights law), freedom of conscience and nonestablishment 
were independent propositions, and one could accept one 
proposition without accepting the other. 
So the historical claim that Americans largely converged in 
believing that public monetary support for religion violates the 
consciences of taxpayers turns out to unpersuasive-
separationist wishful thinking, perhaps. But what about the en-
tailment claim? It could be that Jefferson was right (even though 
not all Americans were, or are, willing to concede this). Maybe a 
taxpayer's freedom of conscience is violated when her tax dollars 
are spent on causes to which she is opposed in conscience. We 
need to consider the question more closely. 
IV. OF COMPLICITY AND COERCED 
AFFIRMATIONS 
So, is there a good argument that using tax money to further 
ends to which a taxpayer is conscientiously (and not merely po-
litically or prudentially) opposed violates the taxpayer's con-
science? The question brings us back to Aland Betty. And as we 
saw earlier, at least in the abstract the proposition seems plausi-
ble. Wasn't this exactly the position taken by Henry David Tho-
reau, who refused to pay a tax to support the war with Mexico 
because he thought the war was morally unjustified? No one was 
asking Thoreau himself to pick up his rifle and join the troops, 
but Thoreau thought that paying a tax to support the war would 
implicate him in the moral offense39 - and he thereby became 
one of our legendary conscientious objectors. 
Thoreau's view has its logic. Under the label of "complicity" 
or "cooperation with evil," we often regard people who support 
immoral activities as sharing in the immorality. People who fund 
terrorists are themselves complicit in the terrorism. People who 
give money to subversive or traitorous groups and activities are 
themselves guilty of subversion or treason. If it would be a viola-
tion of your conscience to do X, it should similarly be a violation 
of conscience if you pay other people to do X. 
ent of their choice for their own financial contribution. FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 41. 
And typically some such designation was allowed. But again, views differed: the argu-
ment that compelling a person to pay taxes to support a religion with which he disagreed 
violated freedom of conscience was considered at length and explicitly rejected in Barnes 
v. First Parish of Falmowh, 6 Mass. 401, 408-11 (1810), which objected that the claim 
"seems to mistake a man's conscience for his monev." /d. at 408. 
39. See Henry David Thoreau, On the Dwy of Civil Disobedience (1849). 
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So the logic is not implausible. Still, doubts arise. In assess-
ing moral culpability, ethicists often see a crucial distinction be-
tween acting voluntarily with the intention of bringing about an 
evil and acting with the knowledge that bad consequences may 
be an unwanted side effect, but without the intention to produce 
those effects.40 In this vein, we might pronounce a judgment of 
complicity on someone who voluntarily contributes money to an 
immoral cause with the intention of bringing about an immoral 
result. But it is much less clear (Thoreau notwithstanding) that a 
person who is compelled by law and against his will to pay taxes 
that are used for immoral purposes should be held responsible 
for the evil. In addition, the person adjudged to be complicit will 
typically have contributed money consciously and specifically to 
some immoral cause or activity. The taxpayer, by contrast, pays 
money into a general fund which is used to support a whole vari-
ety of activities and programs-most of which the taxpayer 
knows little or nothing about, and many of which are presump-
tively beneficial. So again, it is far from clear that the taxpayer 
has any responsibility for the fact that some of the money is used 
for purposes to which she is conscientiously opposed. 
Even more fundamentally, the complicity rationale as de-
scribed thus far seems too sweeping, or too crude. The rationale 
does nothing to distinguish between Al and Betty, or between 
conscientious objections to religious and nonreligious expendi-
tures. But as we have noted already, an argument that would op-
erate to excuse from tax obligations everyone who is opposed in 
conscience to some use of public money could not be accepted, 
because accepting it would wreak havoc on the civil order. 
So it seems we need a rationale that is narrower in the scope 
of protection it would afford. The statement from Jefferson 
quoted above suggests a possibility. What was "sinful and tyran-
nical," in Jefferson's statement, was not compelling a taxpayer to 
pay for ends of which he disapproved, but rather compelling him 
40. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Limits of Objectivity, in 1 THE TANNER LECfURES 
ON HUMAN VAWES 75, 130 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980): 
It is also possible to foresee that one's actions will cause or fail to prevent a 
harm that one does not intend to bring about or perrmt. In that case It IS not, In 
the relevant sense, something one does, and does not come under a deontologi-
cal constraint, though it may still be objectionable for impersonal reasons. 
See also John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. 
L. REV. 303, 318-19 (1998) (distinguishing between "formal cooperation" with evil, 
which is "always immoral," and "material cooperation," which "involves an act that has 
the effect of h-elping a wrongdoer, where the cooperator does not share in the wrong-
doer's immoral intention''). 
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to support "opinions which he disbelieves." The statement sug-
gests that claims of conscience have special force in matters of 
expression of opinion or belief. It is not necessarily tyrannical, or 
a violation of conscience, to make a taxpayer pay for programs 
(a war, for example) to which he is conscientiously opposed. But 
it is tyrannical to force the taxpayer to subsidize the promulga-
tion of opinions he disbelieves. 
Carelessly considered, modern First Amendment decisions 
may appear to provide the material to support this argument. 
We might elaborate the argument in the form of two proposi-
tions, each of which can claim some support in the modern case-
law. First, the First Amendment protects citizens against com-
pelled affirmations. Government cannot force people, in other 
words, to say things they do not believe.41 Second, for constitu-
tional purposes, money talks. Contributing money to support the 
expression of an opinion is itself a way of expressing the opin-
ion.42 From the conjunction of these propositions, it may seem to 
follow that government cannot force a person to contribute 
money that will be used to support the expression of opinions 
the person disbelieves and opposes: to do so would be to compel 
an affirmation, which is something the First Amendment forbids. 
And this seems to be pretty much what Jefferson asserted. 
Modern caselaw does not in fact draw this conclusion,43 however; 
nor could it. Once again, the rationale is simply too broad to be 
acceptable. To put the point differently, even the narrower 
"compelled affirmation" rationale covers Betty as well as AI. In-
deed, the logic of the rationale may fit Betty better than it fits AI. 
That is because Betty actually believes that the ideas that she 
wishes not to subsidize-evolution, perhaps, or "safe sex" for 
teenagers, or any number of other ideas regularly taught in the 
public schools-are false and pernicious. She would rather that 
they not be taught anywhere; and she certainly has scruples 
against supporting their inculcation in any context. AI, on the 
other hand, very likely does not think the same of the religious 
ideas that he wishes not to subsidize. AI might think this, of 
41 The classic case is West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943). For a provocative discussion criticizing this venerable assumption, see Larry 
Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147(2006). 
42. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
43. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). In a few in-
stances, however, the Court has ruled in favor of persons who objected to being com-
pelled to subsidize speech by private associations. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The limited scope of this right is emphasized in Johanns v. 
Livestock Mktg Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
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course: he might be a devout atheist who would like to see relig-
ion disappear altogether. But in the America of 1790 or the 
America of 2006, it is at least as likely that Al's objection is not 
so much to the religious ideas themselves as to public support for 
the promotion of those ideas. Al typically will protest that he is 
not opposed to religion, and that he is perfectly content to have 
such religious beliefs taught in private homes and churches. In-
deed, we could easily recast Al as a religious liberal who actually 
agrees with the religious ideas in question (whatever they hap-
pen to be), who in fact teaches similar ideas in his role as a Sun-
day School teacher, but who thinks the government should not be 
supporting and promoting such ideas. Hence, if Betty is not ex-
cused from paying her taxes she can fairly say that she has been 
"compel[led] . . . to furnish contributions of money for the 
propagation of opinions which [sjhe disbelieves"; Al may not be 
able to say as much. 
But our question was whether a plausible argument could 
be advanced for recognizing Al's objection in conscience to sub-
sidizing the teaching of religious ideas while refusing to recog-
nize Betty's objection in conscience to subsidizing the promulga-
tion of what she regards as anti-religious ideas. And it seems that 
the Jeffersonian contention fails to give us that argument. Its 
terms and its logic cover all publicly subsidized "propagation of 
opinions" that some taxpayers may "disbelieve" -religious or 
not. And given the fact that there are large numbers of citizens 
who "disbelieve" all manner of opinions taught in the public 
schools or subsidized in other ways, this broader argument is 
again one which, as a practical matter, we cannot expect courts 
ever to embrace. 
So does it follow that the noble sentiments expressed in Jef-
ferson's revered statute were simply misguided? Maybe. But 
perhaps we could rescue Jefferson by supposing that he wrote in 
a context in which subsidization of Christian ministers was 
thought to be just about the only form of public financial support 
for the expression of controversial opinions. If we view the mat-
ter in this way, then we might conclude that although Jefferson's 
view was viable and attractive on his assumptions and for his 
time and place, it simply cannot be embraced today in a world in 
which government pervasively makes and supports expressions 
of controversial opinions. 
Either way, there is no apparent excuse for the opportunis-
tic practice by which people like Justice Souter invoke the Jef-
fersonian proposition selectively to shut down aid for the sup-
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port of some controversial views while blithely failing to notice 
that similar subsidies are routinely made available for the sup-
port of a whole array of other controversial views.44 
IV. ANTI-RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION? 
Our assessment of the entailment claim -or, rather, of its 
implausibility-may shed some light on the recurring contro-
versy in which some citizens and Justices accuse other citizens 
and Justices of being "hostile" to religion, and in which the ac-
cused indignantly deny the charge.45 We can charitably suppose 
that in ruling to invalidate various forms of aid to religion, sepa-
rationist Justices are not being consciously hostile to religion. 
They are simply enforcing a constitutional prohibition as they 
understand it. Still, if a principle is consistently enforced against 
one set of causes and parties but conveniently forgotten when 
other causes and other parties' interests are at issue, suspicions 
will naturally arise.46 
Suppose there is a classroom with a rule against talking in 
class without permission. The teacher disciplines Susy and Jane 
several times for whispering in class, and when they suggest that 
44. So, should we conclude that the American commitment to noncstablishmcnt is 
based on a mistake, and that the position of international human rights law requiring 
freedom of religion and freedom of conscience but not nonestablishment is the sounder 
position'! See supra note 18. Not necessarily. The ostensible connection of conscience to 
nonestablishment is a theme that has been historically important in this country, but it is 
surely not the only reason for favoring a constitutional prohibition on the establishment 
of religion. Those other reasons may be more than sufficient to support the American 
commitment. In addition, whether or not it was founded on conceptual errors or on con-
ditions that no longer obtain, the commitment to "separation of church and state" is by 
now a firmly entrenched feature of the American constitutional tradition, arguably cen-
tral to our national identity. Tradition itself furnishes a more than adequate justification 
for maintaining that commitment. See Steven D. Smith, Separation as a Tradition, 18 J. 
LAW & POLITICS 215 (2002). 
To be sure, abandonment of the "entailment claim" might make for a somewhat dif-
ferently shaped nonestablishment commitment. I have already noted, for example, how 
the specialized doctrine of taxpayer standing for establishment clause cases arguably 
rests on the implicit assumption that public expenditures for religious purposes violate 
the consciences of objecting taxpayers, and thereby cause the sort of personalized injury 
that allows them to bring suit. Without that assumption, the doctrine of standing might 
be different; a different standing doctrine might lead to different cases, and hence a dif-
ferent substantive doctrine on the subject. There is no way to know. But in any case, the 
basic commitment to nonestablishment does not seem threatened. 
45. See, .e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doc, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, 
1., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion "bristles with hostility to all things reli-
gious in public life"). 
46. Cf Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Newrality toward 
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1010 (1990) (arguing that Justice Stevens' unusual vot-
ing pattern in religion cases can best be explained by "hostility to religion"). 
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she is being mean to them she explains that, no, she is simply en-
forcing the rule. Rules are rules. But when Carlos and Horace 
engage in what looks like similar behavior, the teacher appears 
not to notice. If someone asks about this, she says she assumed 
that they were "conferring" or doing some other legitimate task. 
The teacher might actually believe her own explanations. But 
observers will understandably begin to suspect that her real 
(though perhaps subconscious) motives must be different than 
her announced ones. 
By the same token, when people like Justice Souter rou-
tinely invoke the sanctity of conscience in supporting the claims 
of the Als of the world (even when the Als' claims have a tenu-
ous grounding in the constitutional text) but seem not even to 
conceive of the possibility of employing the same reasoning in 
behalf of the Bettys of the world (even though the Bettys' claims 
have if anything a firmer footing in the text), observers are natu-
rally going to wonder what is really going on. 
